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Abstract
Background: The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the delivery of immunisation services globally. Many countries
have postponed vaccination campaigns out of concern about infection risks to the staff delivering vaccination, the
children being vaccinated, and their families. The World Health Organization recommends considering both the
benefit of preventive campaigns and the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission when making decisions about campaigns
during COVID-19 outbreaks, but there has been little quantification of the risks.
Methods: We modelled excess SARS-CoV-2 infection risk to vaccinators, vaccinees, and their caregivers resulting
from vaccination campaigns delivered during a COVID-19 epidemic. Our model used population age structure and
contact patterns from three exemplar countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Brazil). It combined an existing
compartmental transmission model of an underlying COVID-19 epidemic with a Reed-Frost model of SARS-CoV-2
infection risk to vaccinators and vaccinees. We explored how excess risk depends on key parameters governing
SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility, and aspects of campaign delivery such as campaign duration, number of vaccinations,
and effectiveness of personal protective equipment (PPE) and symptomatic screening.
Results: Infection risks differ considerably depending on the circumstances in which vaccination campaigns are
conducted. A campaign conducted at the peak of a SARS-CoV-2 epidemic with high prevalence and without
special infection mitigation measures could increase absolute infection risk by 32 to 45% for vaccinators and 0.3 to
0.5% for vaccinees and caregivers. However, these risks could be reduced to 3.6 to 5.3% and 0.1 to 0.2%
respectively by use of PPE that reduces transmission by 90% (as might be achieved with N95 respirators or high-
quality surgical masks) and symptomatic screening.
Conclusions: SARS-CoV-2 infection risks to vaccinators, vaccinees, and caregivers during vaccination campaigns can
be greatly reduced by adequate PPE, symptomatic screening, and appropriate campaign timing. Our results support
the use of adequate risk mitigation measures for vaccination campaigns held during SARS-CoV-2 epidemics, rather
than cancelling them entirely.
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Background
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), has severely disrupted healthcare
service delivery globally. In a pulse survey of key infor-
mants between May and July 2020, respondents from
90% of the surveyed countries reported disruptions to
essential health services, with the greatest disruptions re-
ported in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
[1]. The same survey reported that one of the most se-
verely disrupted services has been the delivery of both
outreach and facility-based immunisation.
This disruption has resulted from multiple factors in-
cluding interruption of supply chains, limitations on
travel, and diversion of finances and healthcare workers
due to COVID-19 and the associated response. One im-
portant reason for the disruption has been concern
around the potential for SARS-CoV-2 transmission dur-
ing the provision of immunisation, particularly through
delivery of vaccination campaigns [2]. There is particular
concern over putting vaccination staff at increased risk
of COVID-19, since healthcare workers are already at
high risk of COVID-19 [3], and healthcare workforce
pressures are particularly acute due to the need to care
for COVID-19 patients.
In March 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Pan
American Health Organisation (PAHO) recommended a
temporary suspension of preventative immunisation
campaigns but encouraged the continuation of routine
immunisation [2, 4]. In November 2020, with the first
COVID-19 wave abating in many LMICs, WHO issued
more nuanced recommendations encouraging countries
to evaluate decisions around vaccine campaigns by con-
sidering both the risk of disease from missed vaccine
doses and the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during
campaigns [5]. Some countries (e.g. Ethiopia, DRC, and
Somalia) that had previously cancelled and postponed
vaccine campaigns had reinstated them in September
2020 [6–8]. The cancellation of vaccination campaigns
has also impacted global efforts to eradicate polio, which
is itself an ongoing public health emergency of inter-
national concern [9].
However, quantitative evidence about SARS-CoV-2 in-
fection risk during vaccination campaigns is limited and
urgently needed as many countries face new COVID-19
waves in 2021. Previous modelling studies have demon-
strated that the benefits of continuing routine immun-
isation likely outweigh the excess risk from COVID-19
but did not examine campaign delivery [10]. A recent
study has examined the risks of vaccine-preventable dis-
ease outbreaks (measles, meningococcal A, and yellow
fever) associated with delaying immunisation campaigns,
which varied across countries [11]. Another study
assessed the risk of measles outbreaks in Kenya and
found that although COVID-19 interventions also tem-
porarily reduced the risk of an outbreak from measles
immunity gaps, this risk rises rapidly once these restric-
tions are lifted highlighting the need to implement
catch-up campaigns [12]. One study looked at the risk of
transmission in the community during fixed-post or
house-to-house immunisation campaigns in six coun-
tries (Angola, Ecuador, Pakistan, Ukraine, Nepal, and
Lao PDR) but did not model specific interactions be-
tween vaccination staff and service users [13].
To address this evidence gap, this study models the
additional risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection to children re-
ceiving vaccination (hereinafter vaccinees), their accom-
panying caregivers, and vaccinators delivering either
fixed-post or house-to-house vaccination campaigns
during a simulated COVID-19 epidemic. Our analysis
uses demographics from three exemplar countries (Bur-
kina Faso, Ethiopia, and Brazil) and explores which fac-
tors are most important in determining the magnitude
of these infection risks.
Methods
We developed a modelling framework that combines an
existing compartmental transmission model of SARS-
CoV-2 (CovidM) with a novel mathematical model of
SARS-CoV-2 infection risk during campaigns [14]. The
transmission model was used to simulate different epi-
demic scenarios in the general population at a national
level (i.e. without regional stratification) in different
country settings. We then examined the additional infec-
tion risk to vaccinators, vaccinees, and their caregivers
of immunisation campaigns conducted at different
points during the epidemic. We also explored how this
risk depends on key aspects of campaign delivery such
as duration of the campaign, number of children vacci-
nated, and effectiveness of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) in reducing transmission.
SARS-CoV-2 transmission model
We performed deterministic simulations of the SARS-
CoV-2 epidemic using CovidM, which uses an age-
stratified compartmental SEIR structure (Susceptible,
Exposed, Infected—with sub-compartments for asymp-
tomatic, pre-symptomatic, and symptomatic infection—
and Recovered) and has been described in detail by Davies
et al. [14] We use the same values as Davies et al. for epi-
demiological parameters including the latent period, and
duration of sub-clinical, pre-clinical, and clinical infec-
tiousness. We also make the same assumptions about the
probability of developing clinical symptoms amongst dif-
ferent age groups [15]. Our simulations assumed no wan-
ing of natural immunity.
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To explore the potential impact of population age
structure and social contact patterns on our results, we
parameterised our model using data for three exemplar
countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Brazil (Additional
file 1: Fig. S1 and Fig. S2). We used population data
from the United Nations population estimates [16], and
for social contact patterns, we utilised country- and age-
specific synthetic contact matrices reported by Prem
et al. [17] These countries were chosen based on having
respectively the lowest, median, and highest population
median age amongst countries with a measles vaccin-
ation campaign planned for 2020 [18] (but excluding
high-income countries and countries for which social
contact matrices were unavailable). Our objective was
not to predict the actual SARS-CoV-2 epidemics experi-
enced by these particular countries, but rather to gener-
ate plausible scenarios using alternative demography and
contact patterns to examine the implications for the risk
associated with vaccination campaigns.
For our base case analysis, we modelled an epidemic
with an R0 of 2 and explored alternative values as a sen-
sitivity analysis (Table 1). A meta-analysis of the litera-
ture reported a mean R0 of 2.6 (SD 0.5) [19]; however,
we chose a lower value to reflect the impact of measures
such as hand hygiene, mask-wearing, and improved in-
door ventilation on community transmission. We add-
itionally assumed a base case reduction of 40% in all
non-household contacts (i.e. school, work, and other set-
tings) to reflect the impact of physical distancing policies
and varied these parameters in sensitivity analyses.
These assumptions were chosen to generate partially
mitigated epidemics that persist over a period of many
months. Such scenarios are likely to be most challenging
from a decision-making perspective. If mitigation is
much stronger, the epidemic will be completely sup-
pressed, and conversely with little mitigation most of the
population will become infected; in either case, vaccin-
ation campaigns are likely to represent a little additional
risk.
The model was run for a period of 2 years, with the
epidemics seeded by a fixed number of individuals aged
between 20 and 50 each day during the first week of the
simulations; this number being chosen for each country
such that the total number of infections seeded was 1
per 100,000 of the general population. The outputs from
the simulations were then used to calculate the overall
proportion of the population (across all age groups) on a
given day t that is either susceptible (st), exposed (et),
Table 1 Model parameters used in the base case and one-way sensitivity analyses
Parameter Description Base case Sensitivity analysis Source
R0 Basic reproduction number 2.0 1.8, 2.2 Assumed
Age-specific contact matrices See Additional file 1: Fig S2. 17
Reduction in contacts outside of home due to NPIs 40% 20%, 60% (30%, 20%)a Assumed
Susceptibility to infection on contact Derived from R0 as described in Davies
et al.
14
de Latent period (pre-infectious) 4 days 2 days, 6 days 14
dr Duration of infectiousness 5 days 3 days, 7 days 14
dc Duration of the vaccination campaign 10 days 5 days, 20 daysb Expert
opinion +
8,23






















Number of extra community contacts of vaccinators for each household




House-to-house: 0, 2 Assumed
π Effectiveness of PPE in reducing transmission 75% 0%, 50%, 90%, 100% 22,27
ρ Relative effectiveness of PPE in reducing transmission to vaccinators or
vaccinees/caregivers
1 0.5 for vaccinators, 0.5 for
caregivers
Assumed
aThis was used to model the assumption of faster epidemics amongst healthcare workers
bWe performed two separate sensitivity analyses for campaign duration: (i) υ was kept constant so the total number of vaccinations per vaccinator changed with
campaign duration; (ii) υ was simultaneously adjusted so the total number of vaccinations per vaccinator remained constant
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infected but asymptomatic ðiat Þ , infected but pre-
symptomatic ðipt Þ , infected and symptomatic ðistÞ , or re-
covered (rt). These outputs were then used as inputs into
the vaccination campaign risk model (described below.)
Vaccination campaign risk model
Risk to vaccinators
We first estimate the infection risk to vaccinators by ex-
tending our previous work [10] on the risk associated
with routine immunisation based on a Reed-Frost type
model [20, 21]. For a susceptible vaccinator, the individ-
ual risk of becoming infected by day d of a vaccination






  2þnυjð Þυ
and the excess risk amongst all vaccinators accounting




t;d ¼ P″t;d  stþd
where the prevalence of infectious individuals
amongst community members attending vaccination
services is p
0
t ¼ ipt þ ist þ iat in scenarios without symp-
tomatic screening and p
0
t ¼ ipt þ iat in scenarios with
symptomatic screening; u is the transmissibility (prob-
ability of transmission per contact) of SARS-CoV-2,
and υ is the daily number of individuals vaccinated by
the vaccinator. For symptomatic screening, this as-
sumes the maximum potential impact whereby the
contribution of all symptomatic individuals to trans-
mission is reduced to zero. For house-to-house cam-
paigns, vaccinators are assumed to contact additional
nυj community members when travelling between
households. The transmissibility u is governed by R0
and country-specific contact patterns and was derived
using CovidM by calculating the ratio of R0 to the
dominant eigenvalue of the next-generation matrix
(see supplementary appendix of Davies et al. [14])
In the base case, the fraction of vaccinators susceptible
on day t in the absence of the campaign is assumed to
be the same as for the general population, st. We assume
that the combined effect of PPE available to the vaccina-
tors and other hygiene measures leads to a reduction by
a factor π in transmission. In scenario analysis, we ex-
plore the impact if the effect of PPE is lower (by a factor
ρ) at protecting either vaccinators or vaccinees and care-
givers, which might occur, for example, due to the differ-
ences in type and/or use of PPE, or to different impacts
on source control vs personal protection [22].
Risk to vaccinees and their caregivers
Amongst susceptible individuals, the risk of either the
vaccinee and/or their caregiver being infected on day d




t;d ¼ 1− 1−u 1−ρπð Þp}t;d
 2ncυ
 1−u  ptþd
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where ncj is the number of community contacts during
the visit to the vaccine clinic (assumed to be zero for
house-to-house campaigns), p″t;d is the prevalence
amongst vaccinators on day d of a campaign that began
on day t, and all other terms have the same meaning as
above. We account for the fact that vaccinators who are
infected as a result of the campaign will not become in-
fectious until after a period de and will subsequently re-
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where the factor σ is set to σ = 1 for scenarios without
symptomatic screening, and for scenarios with symp-
tomatic screening we assume that on a given day d the
proportion of vaccinators infected as a result of the cam-
paign who are symptomatic is the same as the symptom-
atic fraction in the general community such that




Model input parameters for the vaccination risk model
are listed in Table 1. In our base case, we assume that,
prior to the vaccination campaign, vaccinators have the
same baseline infection risk as the general population.
However, we also investigated scenarios in which health-
care workers were assumed to experience a faster epi-
demic and therefore have an initially higher prevalence
of infection, than the general population. This was mod-
elled as an independent epidemic assuming a smaller re-
duction in out-of-home contacts, since healthcare
workers must continue to work with the public. We as-
sumed the same average duration for the latent and in-
fectious periods as used in the transmission model.
To inform our assumptions about vaccine campaign
characteristics, we used a combination of literature
values together with expert advice from a group of im-
munisation planning staff. According to the WHO
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guidance, immunisation campaigns usually take place
within a short timeframe lasting from a few days to
about 1 month [23]. For our base case, we modelled a
campaign of 10 days duration, similar to a recent mea-
sles campaign in Ethiopia [8] and varied this in sensitiv-
ity analyses from 5 to 20 days. We assumed that
vaccinators would vaccinate an average of 150 children
per day for fixed-post campaigns and 75 children per
day in house-to-house campaigns [23, 24].
Evidence about social contacts relevant to infection
transmission during healthcare visits is limited. One
study in Singapore found that visitors to a hospital had a
median of 2 contacts with healthcare workers (range 0–
12) and 1 contact with other visitors (range 0–6) [25]. A
time-and-motion study in India found that an immun-
isation clinic required caregivers and their children to
come into contact with staff stationed at three separate
tables within the clinic [26]. Therefore, we concluded
that contacts during fixed-post immunisation visits are
likely to be in single digits. For house-to-house cam-
paigns, discussion with immunisation planning staff indi-
cated that vaccinators are likely to have very few
additional contacts, unless travelling in poor urban areas
on foot. Our vaccination risk model implicitly assumes
that the same meaning of a contact that underpins the
contact matrices from Prem et al. [17] either a physical
contact or a two-way conversation in which 3 or more
words were exchanged.
Hence, for fixed-post campaigns, children and their
caregivers were assumed to come into contact with an
average of 5 additional people in the clinic waiting area
and during their journey to and from the vaccine clinic.
In contrast, for house-to-house campaigns, children and
caregivers were assumed to have no additional commu-
nity contacts, but vaccinators were assumed to have one
additional community contact for each child vaccinated.
To assess the impact of different parameter assumptions,
these were varied in the sensitivity analysis.
For the effectiveness of PPE, cloth masks may reduce
transmission by around 50–80% [22], while N95 respira-
tors can achieve even higher reductions [27] but may
not be available in all settings.
Results
Our base case simulations resulted in epidemics that are
similar across country settings (Fig. 1). In our base case
scenario, with R0 = 2 and a 40% reduction in out-of-
home contacts, the epidemic lasts for around 1 year with
a peak incidence of 0.23 to 0.26% per day, a peak preva-
lence of 1.6 to 1.8%, and between 29 and 31% of the
population infected by the end of the epidemic. We ob-
tained very similar values when using demography and
contact patterns for all three countries. Using alternative
R0 values of 1.8 or 2.2 resulted in a peak prevalence of
0.6 to 3.1% and cumulative infections that ranged be-
tween 18 and 40%. A lower, 20%, reduction in contacts
Fig. 1 Modelled incidence (A), prevalence (B), and cumulative proportion of the population infected (C) for different R0 assumptions
Procter et al. BMC Medicine          (2021) 19:198 Page 5 of 12
leads to higher peak prevalence (4.8 to 5.1%), whereas
60% contact reduction results in suppression of the epi-
demic (Additional file 1: Fig. S3.)
The prevalence of infection in the community (Fig. 1
and Additional file 1: Fig. S3) at the time of the cam-
paign is a key driver of excess infection risk for both vac-
cinators (Fig. 2A and Additional file 1: Fig. S6A) and
children and their caregivers (Fig. 2B and Additional file
1: Fig. S6B). In the base case scenario, peak excess risk
of infection without effective PPE or symptomatic
screening ranged from 32 to 45% for vaccinators and
0.30 to 0.54% for children and their caregivers. If PPE is
75% effective at preventing transmission, these excess
risks fall to 10 to 15% and 0.15 to 0.25%, respectively.
Symptomatic screening alone, without effective PPE,
only leads to a drop in excess infection risk of 2.3 to
4.5% for vaccinators and 0.03 to 0.08% for vaccinees and
caregivers. With PPE that reduces transmission risk by
Fig. 2 Modelled excess risk of A vaccinators and B children and/or caregivers becoming infected during fixed-post immunisation campaigns
conducted at different times during the epidemic. The results are shown for epidemics modelled using different R0 assumptions. The line colour
shows the impact of different levels of PPE effectiveness, and the dashed lines show the combined impact of PPE together with symptomatic
screening (assumed to screen out all symptomatic individuals)
Procter et al. BMC Medicine          (2021) 19:198 Page 6 of 12
90% and symptomatic screening, vaccinators’ risks can
be further reduced to 3.6 to 5.3%. However, for vaccine
recipients, the additional risk reduction is only slight
(from 0.14 to 0.23%) since the remaining excess risk is
dominated by other community contacts. Hence, provid-
ing even a moderate (50%) level of PPE for vaccinators
may achieve most of the risk reduction for vaccinees and
their caregivers (Fig. 2B).
If healthcare workers are assumed to have a higher
day-to-day risk of infection than the general population,
then the baseline prevalence of infection amongst vacci-
nators (before the campaign) will be higher than that in
the community during the earlier part of the epidemic
(Additional file 1: Fig. S3). As a result, the excess infec-
tion risk for vaccinators due to the immunisation cam-
paign is reduced (Additional file 1: Fig. S4A) because,
compared to the base case, a lower proportion of vacci-
nators remain susceptible at a given point in the epi-
demic. For children and caregivers (Additional file 1: Fig.
S4B), the impact is more nuanced. Excess infection risk
is increased earlier in the epidemic since prevalence in
vaccinators is higher and more children and caregivers
are susceptible. But, later in the epidemic, the excess risk
can remain (relatively) high as prevalence rises amongst
community contacts. However, this pattern is dependent
on the extent of the lag between our modelled epidemics
for the vaccinators and the general population.
For house-to-house delivery, compared to fixed-post
delivery, under our base case assumptions, the excess
risk is predicted to be lower both for the vaccinators
(Additional file 1: Fig. S5A) and for vaccinees and care-
givers (Additional file 1: Fig. S5B). For children, the risk
is lower compared to fixed-post delivery because there
are assumed to be no additional community contacts
that arise from travelling to or from a vaccine clinic. For
the vaccinators, the risk is lower because the number of
children vaccinated per worker is lower, but if the num-
ber of people that vaccinators come into contact with
during travel between households rises, then the risk is
increased.
In deterministic sensitivity analysis (Fig. 3), we found
that for vaccinators, the peak excess infection risk was
most sensitive to R0 (and the correspondingly higher
peak in community prevalence) and to the total number
of children vaccinated by each vaccinator during the
campaign, which depends in turn on the number of vac-
cinations per day and the campaign duration. There is
almost no impact of varying the campaign duration
while holding the total number of vaccinations constant.
Comparing scenarios with and without PPE, although
Fig. 3 Sensitivity analysis showing the impact of varying model input parameters on the peak value of excess infection risk to vaccinators. The
changes compared to the base case (in Table 1) are shown for the minimum (lighter shading) and maximum (darker shading) parameter values
shown in Table 1 and for two different assumptions about PPE effectiveness
Procter et al. BMC Medicine          (2021) 19:198 Page 7 of 12
this changes the overall excess risk, the model remains
sensitive to the same parameters.
However, in the case of vaccinees and their caregivers,
the factors that most influence the excess infection risk
differ depending on the effectiveness of PPE (Fig. 4). If
PPE is effective at reducing transmission, excess risk is
affected most by infections from other community mem-
bers, which depends on the number of contacts and R0.
Without effective PPE, excess risk is also influenced by
how likely vaccinators are to be infected and how long
they remain infectious during the campaign. For ex-
ample, a shorter campaign duration, a shorter infectious
period, or a longer period of latent infection all reduce
the chances of vaccinees and caregivers coming into
contact with vaccinators infected during the campaign
while they are infectious.
Discussion
Using a compartmental transmission model to simulate
an epidemic combined with a modified Reed-Frost
model, we have estimated the increased infection risk to
vaccinators, vaccinated children, and caregivers, of con-
ducting a vaccination campaign during a SARS-CoV-2
outbreak. We find that these risks differ considerably de-
pending on the circumstances in which campaigns are
conducted, and the extent to which WHO guidelines are
followed.
In the most pessimistic scenarios (e.g. campaigns con-
ducted at the peak of an epidemic without effective
PPE), the risks to vaccinators can exceed a 40% increase
in infection rate. For vaccinated children and their care-
givers, the excess risks are much lower and may be simi-
lar to day-to-day infection risk in the general population
in lower-risk scenarios (e.g. house-to-house campaigns).
These risks can be dramatically reduced during
campaigns, even when community prevalence is high,
through the use of effective PPE and by conducting
symptomatic screening and isolation of vaccinators.
Overall, a campaign at the peak of an outbreak with-
out PPE or screening increases vaccinator risk by an
additional 32 to 45% and vaccinee risk by 0.3 to 0.5%.
With moderately effective PPE (75%) and screening,
this drops to 10 to 15% and 0.15 to 0.25%. At very
high levels of effectiveness (90%) consistent with evi-
dence about N95 respirators and other surgical-
quality masks, the excess risk for vaccinators can be
reduced to 3.6 to 5.3%. These findings support the
guidance given by WHO and other associated agen-
cies on the use of adequate PPE and hygiene mea-
sures when carrying out campaigns [2].
Fig. 4 Sensitivity analysis showing the impact of varying model input parameters on the peak value of excess infection risk to children and their
caregivers. The changes compared to the base case (in Table 1) are shown for the minimum (lighter shading) and maximum (darker shading)
parameter values shown in Table 1 and for two different assumptions about PPE effectiveness
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For vaccinators, in addition to the high community
prevalence of SARS-CoV-2, a key factor that increases
risk is vaccinating a high number of children during the
campaign. However, while the risk for an individual vac-
cinator can be reduced by vaccinating fewer children,
this would require more vaccinators to reach the same
size population. We also found that when PPE effective-
ness is low, a short campaign (and consequently vaccin-
ating many people a day) can reduce infection risk for
vaccinees and caregivers compared to a longer campaign
vaccinating the same number of people overall. How-
ever, this assumes that the adequacy of infection control
measures is unaffected by campaign duration and the
number of individuals vaccinated per day.
Despite the potential for risk mitigation, vaccine cam-
paigns still carry the potential for SARS-CoV-2 transmis-
sion that needs to be traded off with protecting
populations from other vaccine-preventable diseases.
These risk-benefit calculations will need to take into ac-
count local conditions and are beyond the scope of this
paper, since we have focused only on the risk of
COVID-19 itself. However, other studies offer some
guiding principles. Routine childhood vaccines should
not be interrupted, since the risk of children dying as a
result of not receiving these vaccines far outweighs the
risk of dying from COVID-19 as a result of attending a
vaccine clinic [10]. For vaccine campaigns, the risk of
outbreaks as a result of postponing campaigns varies
across settings and pathogens [11]. For some vaccines
(e.g. meningococcal A), campaigns can be postponed in
the short-term in many settings due to the persistence
of immunity from past campaigns. For other vaccines
(e.g. measles), short-term campaign disruptions can lead
to large outbreaks very quickly, so campaigns postponed
at the height of COVID-19 epidemics should be rein-
stated as soon as possible afterwards. For polio, coun-
tries need to consider the need to avoid jeopardising
progress towards eradication as a result of disruption to
immunisation activities in 2020 [28]. Hence, countries
need to consider existing immunity gaps, epidemic po-
tential of diseases, and wider initiatives when making
difficult decisions about vaccination during COVID-19
outbreaks.
Our study has several limitations in interpretability.
First, the actual excess risk to vaccinators depends on
their counterfactual risk of infection, which we did not
model. If vaccinators are drawn from existing healthcare
workers with frequent patient contact, then even if there
was no vaccination campaign, they would likely be ex-
posed to a high risk of infection without adequate PPE.
In fact, if vaccinators have been exposed to a high risk of
infection prior to the campaign, this will reduce their ex-
cess risk from delivering the campaign, since a large pro-
portion would be either already infected or immune.
However, if many vaccinators are already infected, this
increases the infection risk for vaccine recipients earlier
in the epidemic. Indeed, other analyses have highlighted
the role of vaccinators in seeding epidemics in other lo-
cations if vaccinators from a high prevalence location
deliver vaccination in a lower prevalence location13. Fur-
thermore, we did not consider infection risk to staff de-
livering vaccination campaigns outside of the setting
where contact with vaccinees occurs, such as social in-
teractions between vaccination staff or transport of vac-
cination supplies to clinics.
Second, we did not explicitly assess the contribution of
vaccination campaigns to overall infection prevalence in
the population. However, even at times of higher preva-
lence, this appears likely to be modest compared to the
overall epidemic. This is because only a small portion of
the total population are likely to be involved in cam-
paigns (either as vaccinators or vaccine service users).
The impact of vaccination campaigns on excess infection
risk for vaccinees and their caregivers is low when com-
pared to the risk to vaccinators and associated delivery
staff. However, this is not a rationale to conduct a cam-
paign regardless of the risks if it can safely be postponed,
since a similar argument could be applied to any action
that has only a marginal impact.
Third, to enhance our study’s generalisability, we mod-
elled hypothetical epidemics rather than actual epi-
demics experienced in particular settings. In particular,
the three exemplar countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
and Brazil) simply represent three examples of popula-
tion age structure and age-dependent contacts seen in
LMICs, rather than actual SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology in
the countries. The epidemic of SARS-CoV-2 has varied
considerably within these countries, largely due to the
impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions, the spread
of SARS-CoV-2 variants, and increasingly, the impact of
COVID-19 vaccination. Modelling the particulars of in-
dividual country trajectories was outside the scope of
this study. Consequently, assessing the potential impact
of vaccination campaigns is best achieved by comparing
against the local prevalence of infection in the
community.
Fourth, we lacked empirical data on many key drivers
of infection risk, such as the number of relevant contacts
during clinic visits or during travel between households,
the effectiveness of PPE against transmission, and the
baseline transmission risk associated with healthcare-
specific contacts. Many of these parameters were guided
either by the expert opinion of the vaccine implementers
in our advisory group or from single studies in very dif-
ferent settings. Because of this data gap, we varied these
parameters across wide ranges in sensitivity analysis and
hence obtained a wide range of potential outcomes.
However, if decision-makers have access to more
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specific parameters for their own setting, our open-
access model could be parameterised to inform their
specific decisions.
Fifth, while we used a well-known and extensively vali-
dated model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission [14, 29, 30],
we used a relatively simple extension to capture the risk
to vaccinators and vaccine service users during a cam-
paign. In particular, we do not account for the potential
campaign-related infections spreading beyond the vacci-
nators and service users. This was explored by the mod-
elling by Frey et al., who found that most fixed-post or
house-to-house campaigns do not increase overall infec-
tion risks in the general population substantially [13].
This overall conclusion is consistent with our own work,
which found that even in the most pessimistic scenarios,
overall infection risk to vaccinated children and their
caregivers is increased by less than 1.5%. However, Frey
et al. highlighted the danger of importing infections to
previously naive communities, if vaccinators from one
region are moved to another—this effect was not ex-
plored in our own work.
Sixth, we assume that asymptomatic or pre-
symptomatic vaccinators have the same transmissibility
as symptomatic vaccinators, so we could be underesti-
mating the impact of screening if the contribution of
asymptomatic transmission (that is not removed by
screening) is lower. On the other hand, we assume
screening prevents all transmission from symptomatic
vaccinators, which likely overestimates screening impact,
for example, if individuals have atypical symptoms or if
adherence to isolation policy is low. Lastly, we did not
capture the potential for waning natural immunity,
COVID-19 vaccination, or emergence of new variants,
which may all become increasingly important in the
future.
This analysis raises two important areas of uncertainty
in implementation. The first is that risk mitigation of
vaccine campaigns is most beneficial when SARS-CoV-2
is low, but accurate estimates of incidence can be chal-
lenging in many LMIC settings. While official reporting
of country-level cases is valuable, assessment of the local
epidemiology may be reliant on anecdotal evidence in
some settings. Where possible, more evidence of local
incidence is important for detection and response but
also to prevent further risks from activities such as vac-
cine campaigns. The second is that risk mitigation can
be very successful with the effective use of PPE, but
more specific evidence on what PPE, training, and ad-
herence is sufficient to limit risk during vaccine cam-
paigns is lacking.
Despite the limitations of our study, which can be par-
tially addressed by re-parameterisation of our model at a
country level, the broad conclusions of our study appear
to be robust and are consistent with guidance offered by
WHO [5]. In particular, the excess infection risk during
a vaccination campaign can be very high, particularly to
vaccination staff, but is highly dependent on the timing
and characteristics of the campaign, the effectiveness of
PPE, and the use of symptomatic screening. Other ana-
lyses have found that many vaccination campaigns (such
as for measles) play an important role in filling suscepti-
bility gaps and preventing outbreaks of vaccine-
preventable diseases and should continue after careful
assessment of risks during the COVID-19 pandemic
[11]. Hence, our results support the use of appropriate
risk mitigation measures during campaigns rather than
completely calling them off during SARS-CoV-2 out-
breaks. Our findings also suggest that staff involved in
delivering vaccination campaigns should be considered
as potential priority recipients of COVID-19 vaccines
alongside other priority groups. Finally, although our in-
vestigation specifically focussed on vaccination cam-
paigns, the findings may also be broadly relevant to
other campaign-based community interventions, such as
vitamin A supplementation and wash activities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that the SARS-CoV-2 infection
risks to vaccinators, vaccinees, and their caregivers from
a vaccine campaign conducted during a COVID-19 epi-
demic can vary considerably depending on the circum-
stances under which a campaign is conducted. However,
these risks can be greatly reduced with effective PPE,
symptomatic screening, and appropriate timing of cam-
paigns. Our findings support the continuation of vaccin-
ation campaigns using adequate risk mitigation during
the COVID-19 pandemic, rather than cancelling them
entirely.
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